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Islamism and Masculinity: Case Study Pakistan 
Maleeha Aslam ∗ 
Abstract: »Islamismus und Männlichkeit: Fallstudie zu Pakistan«. In Muslim 
societies, men use Islamism and its variants as means of self-actualization and 
directly in service of matters associated with personhood, masculinity, and par-
ticularly honor. This expressive trajectory i.e. exercising masculinity via Islamism 
holds true in Pakistan and can be broadly attributed to three elements. First, 
Pakistan’s postcolonial baggage – a well-documented history of rise of Muslim 
nationalism, and Islamism in the subcontinent; second, western domination and 
interference in Pakistan’s socio-economic and political domains (as in competi-
tion with Islamic heritage and governance frameworks) affecting some seg-
ments (and not all) among Muslim youth; and third, decades of authoritarian 
rule taking turns with weak democratic governments who have largely disap-
pointed in terms of alleviating absolute to relative poverty, marginalization and 
alienation troubling Pakistani society. Pakistan’s history and contemporary set-
tings both reveal a dissonance between the prescribed, normative and idealized 
Muslim masculinity imperatives – and the socio-economic and political location 
of Pakistani men in the real world. Mostly leading dangerous, disenfranchised, 
and economically deprived lives it is difficult for them to uphold, for example, 
Quran’s masculine imperative of being a qawwam or an ethnic normative of 
honor. Islamism becomes one such avenue that increases the possibility of self-
assertion and actualization of masculinity imperatives and as they appear in 
religious and cultural texts, narratives and anecdotes – for instance the theme 
of martyrdom. The resulting death will not only be divine, but also heroic. In 
the presence of precedence i.e. in form of documented history highlighting ji-
hadism – this becomes plausible and ultimately adds to individual and collec-
tive rationality among Muslims. To develop these ideas further, this article 
draws upon empirical data sets and historical archival records. 
Keywords: Militant/jihadist Islamism, terrorism, masculinity, Pakistan. 
1.  Introduction 
Whether masculinity is taken as a practice or a performance, or a normative 
construct (consult Butler 2006; Connell 2005) – it remains transformable and is 
negotiable. It needs mentioning, however, that expected changes are not sud-
den, but gradual. Through different time periods and cultures, militant and 
                                                             
∗  Maleeha Aslam, Head Gender and Human Security/Research Fellow, Sustainable Develop-
ment Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan; maleeha.aslam@gmail.com.  
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militarized masculinity is presented as some form of an ideal for example, 
knight with the shining armour, the warrior king and the rebel leader etc. Here 
the knight, warrior and rebel become the male archetype – and also a man’s 
best possible self-representation. The male archetype in Muslim cultures, in-
cluding Pakistan, is at least partially similar. Pakistan’s militant Islamism is not 
a new phenomenon but predates the partition of India in 1947, where it appears 
to emerge as a subculture in response and reaction to the British rule. Paki-
stan’s historical context, its ethnic normativities, and the contemporary living 
contexts of its people, i.e. their socio-economic and political standing within 
and outside Pakistan – all continue to make militant masculinity meaningful 
causing escalation in militant or jihadist Islamism and vice versa. Unfortunate-
ly, these militant Islamists (regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with 
their agenda), are always susceptible to getting subsumed under terrorist gangs 
operating worldwide as criminal networks or to kidnapping for ransom while 
having no tangible, or achievable political targets but only towering rhetoric.  
2.  Methodology and Sampling 
This article is based on two major research studies conducted between 2003-
2007 and 2009-2011.1 Some of the ideas presented here have appeared in my 
book Gender based explosions, the nexus between Muslim masculinities, ji-
hadist Islamism and terrorism (Aslam 2012).2 The book explores gender and 
terrorism and its complex interplay with versions of Islamism that remains 
largely an under-researched area. The findings are based on archival and histor-
ical records preserved by the Government of Pakistan. The empirical research 
design of the study draws upon Connell’s theory of multiple masculinities. A 
total of 118 Pakistani Muslim men belonging to similar contexts and within the 
age bracket 18-40 were taken on board and classified as three stratified sam-
ples: low socio-economic group; socially stigmatized and distressed; and uni-
versity students and professionals. The first group consisted of educated jobless 
persons who use secondary sources of income for basic survival, daily-wage 
                                                             
1  Generous awards and grants received from Cambridge Commonwealth Trust; Cambridge 
Political Economy Society Trust; Prince Consort and Thirlwall Trust, Cambridge; Charles Wal-
lace Trust Research Award, London; Smuts Memorial Fund at Cambridge, ORS – Universities 
UK; British Chevening, UK, and finally Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Tokyo. I 
am genuinely grateful to all funders acknowledged here whose support made it possible for 
me to complete my PhD and Post Doctoral programme at Cambridge and the United Na-
tions University, respectively.  
2  Published and released by United Nations University Press in 2012 receiving primary en-
dorsements from Raewyn Connell (author of Masculinities, and University Chair, University 
of Sydney) and Akbar Ahmed (Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies, American University, 
Washington DC).  
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labourers and non-commissioned government staff. The second group included 
substance misusers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Waziristan 
and Swat or those directly afflicted by floods, the war on terror and drone at-
tacks. And the third group was comprised of bankers, commissioned govern-
ment officials, development professionals and MA/PhD students from universi-
ties in Islamabad. Empirical findings of this small-scale pilot study are based 
on multiple sources of evidence (survey questionnaires, focus group discus-
sions, interviews with religious scholars and academics, along with already 
established and published gender theory). Mainly qualitative in nature, quanti-
tative data and analysis (multivariate regression analysis) was also used during 
research, however, those statistical data sets are not presented here.  
3.  Personhood, Masculine Honor and Jihadism 
Honor is more a normative than a distant cultural ideal. Honor is not a value 
that only tribal or feudal cultures are obsessed with but is an integral compo-
nent of the overall Pakistani personhood; their indivisible, individual selves. 
Almost Aristotelian, the Pakistani society views women as incidental and not 
absolute beings, i.e. not really individuals – ultimately placing the onus on men 
to show how honorable they and their families are. Men choose multiple sites 
to play out honor politics; at times using domestic violence against women in 
the name of honor and at times taking political violence as a possibility and 
means towards exerting, preserving or regaining subjective and collective (fam-
ily/clan/national/transnational) “honor.” The studied sample described honor as 
a masculinity imperative mainly consisting of fearlessness, bravery, courage, 
independence, pride and arrogance, and the ability to take action and then stand 
by it regardless of the circumstances. A police constable during his interview 
shared: “A man must look forward – there is no option of looking sideways or 
backwards. Even when he faces death, he should face it with dignity and glory – 
not like a coward. We face death every day.”  
The understanding of masculinity imperatives as already explained appears 
to be intense in those with tribal and rural affiliations. For example, Pukhtun-
wali, the self-representation, and customary code of living of the Pukhtuns, 
predate Islam, consisting of arbitration laws and tribal sets of living for the two 
genders. The Pukhtun nation, residing in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Central 
Asia draw their identity from this code that is principally masculine, egocen-
tric, and orientated towards revenge, and hospitality. The Taliban and Al Qaeda 
have misused this tenet and sought refuge in Pukhtun households who in the 
name of brotherhood and in respect of tradition did not deny hospitality.  
In the first half of the twentieth century, Abdul Ghaffar Khan aka Badshah 
Khan – influenced by Gandhi’s non-violence, and Islam’s message of for-
giveness – tried to promote non-violence among Pukhtuns through the Khudai 
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Khidmatgar (the red shirts) movement. However, his ideological tilt towards 
non-violence did not affect future Pukhtun generations. Even today, as also 
noted by Gilmore (Gilmore 1990, 221), manhood ideologies force men to de-
fend their identity and to prevent any damage to it – a threat apparently worse 
than death. The culture makes weaponry an essential part of Pukhtun male 
identity. It is on the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan that adolescent Pu-
khtun boys are expected to demonstrate their bravery and maturity and associa-
tion with Pukhtunwali by participating in battles (Hawkins 2009, 17). Pukhtun 
tribes operate in a soldierly fashion and use war to display and safeguard per-
sonal, family and tribal honor.  
Churchill, who fought against Pukhtuns wrote: “Every man was a warrior, 
politician and theologian and clans maintained their hostility and conflicts over 
generations” (Hawkins 2009). Participants of the research sample consisting of 
men from Swat and Waziristan who were affected by drone strikes and military 
action explained:  
In order to understand the culture of revenge, we need to understand the con-
cept of Pukhtunwali. […] The way expectations are of me to take revenge […] 
these expectations are not of my sister. She is after all just a woman. But I am 
required as a man to practically maintain our honor.  
Revenge is part of masculine honor. Pakistani courts delay settlement and, of 
course, once matters go to court, the option of revenge is eliminated. Many 
times men prefer taking revenge to close a matter in a more acceptable [to 
family and/or community] manner. 
An understanding of the local and tribal customary codes of conduct may re-
veal more about the mindset and making of jihadist or militant Islamists and/or 
terrorists than perhaps any other thing.  
4.   Islamism in Service of Muslim Masculinities 
Men use Islamism and its variants as means of self-actualization and directly in 
service of matters associated with personhood, masculinity, and particularly 
honor. There are three substantive explanations that I present below in support 
of this argument. The analysis is seated in Pakistan’s history, its location in a 
globalized world, and its multifarious systemic decline. 
4.1  Militant and Non-Militant Islamism and the Rise of Muslim 
Nationalism in the Subcontinent 
Jihadist or militant Islamism, and rhetorical Islamism in contemporary Pakistan 
need to be located within the country’s postcolonial context and the rise of 
Muslim nationalism in pre-partition India. British rule redefined both gender 
and political identities of Indian Muslims in major ways. First, while interact-
ing with both British men and women and competing against Hindus in the job 
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market, Muslim men began to realize that keeping Muslim women uneducated 
and domesticated would ultimately affect the principle political objective, that 
of freedom. Second, Pan-Islamism became the defining feature of Muslim 
political identity under colonial rule. Put differently, British rule allowed re-
definition and renegotiation of both gender identities and political identities for 
Indian Muslims.  
Having stated this, it needs to be mentioned here that gender norms and 
roles started to transform only gradually. Ahmed Khan’s Mohammedan Anglo 
Oriental College at Aligarh (1877) and the All India Mohammedan Educational 
Conference aimed at men, not women. By 1906 Khan’s followers made func-
tional Aligarh Girls School which by 1937 became a degree college. It would 
not be incorrect to argue that the supposedly enlightened Muslim men, initially 
reserved for the male gender modern education; English clothing, mannerisms, 
and skills that were needed for the public domain such as the English language. 
While interacting with the British, Muslim men adopted western mannerisms 
and dress but women were denied integration into British customs. This peculi-
ar gender ordering that reveals the double standards of a society full of contra-
dictions is visible even today. Pakistani men wear business suits, and women 
traditional clothing with their heads covered.  
Muslim masculinity was constructed as privileged, and was principally fash-
ioned around objectives such as identity reassertion; anti-colonial resistance; 
religious revivalism through jihad and tabligh.3 It is important to identify here 
the practices in Muslim masculinity under colonial rule. Mainly religious 
scholars, parties and movements dictated and standardized religion for Muslim 
men and women. If Ashraf Thanvi set standards for Muslim women through a 
book titled Behishti Zevar (i.e. Ornaments of Paradise), Mohammed Ilyas of 
the Tablighi Jama‘at standardized religious practice mainly for men. Around 
the midst of the twentieth century Jama‘at-i Islami politicized Muslims by 
making Sharia, jihad, and the notion of umma (i.e. collective, transnational 
Muslim identity) integral components of individual identity. Men spearheaded 
all such actions. They had taken these tasks upon themselves. These activities 
defined their contexts and out of these contexts emerged proactive Islamist 
masculinity.  
Jihad was not restricted to militancy, but included journalistic, judicial, po-
litical and intellectual activism: there were for example periodicals such as 
Azad’s Al Hilal, Muhammad Ali’s Comrade, Zafar Ali Khan’s Zamindar; 
Hali’s Musaddas which served these objectives. Segments of Muslim men also 
participated in diplomacy and accordingly made attempts at redefining Muslim 
cultural ethic.  
                                                             
3  Means to convey or deliver religious teachings.  
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Quite clearly, transnational Muslim identity was a man’s project, that of Dr. 
Mohammed Iqbal. His poetry is mostly pan-Islamist and commemorative of 
Muslim rule. He generously used Persian and other Muslim languages to reach 
out to the Muslims beyond India. Muslim brotherhood and the associated slo-
ganeering was a man’s vision. The question arises: how did Islam become such 
a prominent theme in the Indian Muslim mindset? 
Robinson (1998) maintains that two factors woke up Muslims of the subcon-
tinent to their Muslim identity. The first being the nineteenth century Islamist 
revivalist movements beyond India, leading to the period of Balkan wars in 
1911 to the abolition of the Turkish Caliphate in 1924; and second, the very 
Christian-aware colonial masters who were not only interested in proselytizing 
activities but also insisted on knowing about the religious identities of their 
subjects. The category Muslim became a major part of the discourse of the 
colonial state, and owing to the fact that the British had acquired power from 
the Muslims, suspicion between the two always remained. Muslims agitated 
against the British; there was, for example, the jihadi movement of the mujahi-
din of Saiyid Agmed Barelwi in northern India, that of Saiyid Fadl Alawi in 
Malabar, and that of Haji Shariatullah in Bengal; there were the Deobandi and 
Ahl-i-Hadith movements in the later nineteenth century and those of Tablighi 
Jama’at and the Jama’ at-i Islami in the twentieth. In archival records the 
British describe Muslims as fanatics and they did not hide their mistrust in 
regular correspondence. Sir Anthony Macdonnell wrote to Curzon in 1890s: 
“We are far more interested in [encouraging] a Hindu predominance than in 
[encouraging] a Mahomedan predominance, which, in the nature of things must 
be hostile to us” (Robinson 1998, 277). Here I argue that if suppression was 
imminent, attempts at identity preservation and reassertion were most expected. 
Viceroy Mayo questioned: “Are the Indian Musalmans bound by their Religion 
to rebel against the Queen?” (Robinson 1998, 277). 
Muslim nationalism needed aggressive masculinity to be the hegemonic 
masculinity. This was particularly true for the province of Sindh where divid-
ing lines between offenders and freedom fighters i.e. heroes of Islam and India 
was bound to blur. Leaders in their anti-colonial struggle used religious sym-
bolism like jihad, umma (community), akhuwat (brotherhood), mainly to mobi-
lize people.  
In this regard, a case in point is the jihadism of Pir Pagaro of Khairpur 
(Sindh).4 The first Pir Pagaro, Sibghatullah Shah was nominated as a successor 
by his father but his brothers attempted to kill him. Immediately a split in the 
disciples occurred and many of them vowed to follow the “one with the tur-
                                                             
4  Literally meaning: “a pir who wears a turban”- and thereby becomes a supreme spiritual 
leader. Please note that Pir Pagaro is a title held by the descendants of an eighteenth cen-
tury sufi saint Pir Muhammad Rashid. Till today, there have been eight Pir Pagaros and 
many of them lived during the British Raj in India. 
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ban,” earning the title “Hur” as a “sacred distinction.” Following this, a few 
people were nominated as khalifas (deputies) who were mainly instrumental in 
organizing the Hurs into a brotherhood (Bacchal 1984, 31) an Islamic value. 
The Hurs swore by the Quran to remain faithful to their Pir. Pervez (Pervez 
1984, 93) describes the scene:  
The Pir called his scribe who handed him the Holy Book wrapped in silken 
cloth; all repeated bismillah [in the name of Allah]. Pir Pagaro standing on a 
platform laid the Quran on everyone’s head, who repeated that he would come 
whenever called, and [that] would give his life on his Pir’s demand.  
The creation of a political pressure group with religious credentials is important 
to note. Pir Sibghatullah II wanted to put an end to colonialism and resorted to 
militant means. He trained and financed the Hurs for fighting against the Brit-
ish. The Hurs – noted as a criminal tribe by the British and literally labeled 
terrorists by Lambrick (1972), were called freedom fighters by the natives. 
Sindh became the site of active resistance and rebellion against the British. 
Ansari (1992) documents the rise of Hurs as a threatening independent power. 
The Hurs belonged to all social statuses and believed in a collective brother-
hood; this belief was so strong that after plundering they would stop in villages 
with Hur inhabitants, armed and fearless, and not one would leak out this in-
formation to the British. Jaffery (1994: 453) records how Hurs made the British 
police go “berserk,” feeling deeply harassed. The Pir was finally imprisoned 
for eight years on charges of murder that could never be proved. Nonetheless 
he was ultimately hanged and secretly buried in 1943. 
Unlike today, in the past it was difficult to imagine religious extremism in 
Muslim contexts. For the British, it remained difficult to ignore the religious 
fascist tendencies of this group. It was not until February 1917 that the Com-
missioner of Sindh argued against labeling “Hurs as a criminal tribe” and in-
stead suggested using the phrase “fanatical sect” for them. It was difficult for 
the Commissioner to understand religion in India. He wrote:  
For the Hurs the faith is a proselytizing faith and draws its adherents freshly 
from all tribes of the Musalman [Muslim] religion and from all strata of socie-
ty [...] they may be regarded as the Mahomedan counterparts of the thugs.5  
Throughout history, the Hurs have been considered as the martial people, fa-
natic fighters of Sindh and mostly devout adherents of Pir Pagaro:  
They (were) famous for their swift and lightening action. Due to their blitz-
krieg the British Empire was compelled to promulgate the first martial law 
[...]. The handful of Hurs defied the mighty trained British forces [...] [they] 
had organised even the suicide squads.6 
                                                             
5  NDC/S-162. 28-02-1917. Confidential letter; written to the collector of Thar and Parker by 
H S Lawrence, Commissioner of Sind, Judicial Department; Camp of Commissioner in Sind. 
6  NDC /S-180. 1973. A note prepared by Pir Bakhsh, the Superintendent of Police, Khairpur. 
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Official records note Hurs mutilating, and particularly castrating their victims 
mercilessly. The Deputy Superintendent Police, Muhammad Sharif reported 
Karam Illahi’s murder in a letter dated December 27th, 1941: “He had 4-5 gun 
shots, 3-4 axe blows, his right hand and private organ had been cut, and badly 
mutilated.”7 
It is important to notice the indulgence of a group that otherwise claimed its 
devotion to religion in such de-gendering acts of violence on fellow Muslims. 
Such actions aimed at leaving the victim as a lesser man, on grounds that in-
stead of joining Hur jihadism, he had chosen to either stay away or spy against 
it. Laiq, son of Sono Jamali of Hameer Jamali wrote a letter to the Deputy 
Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad, on 7th April 1945, noting that he and his 
fellow villagers felt insecure at the hand of Hurs and that they could be killed 
anytime.8 
The British, while perceiving the Hurs as a criminal tribe, actually planned 
and thought that they could be eliminated: “If they (Hurs) are kept in a state of 
fear everywhere, the most immediate result would be that no new men will 
become Hurs [...] Hurism may fade and after all disappear.”9 Sindhi youth 
continues to draw inspiration from the Hurs as I discovered during my field-
work in the village Umar-kanhar, Khairpur, Sindh.  
4.2  Globalization, Islamism and Struggle for Autonomy  
Western domination and interference in Pakistan’s socio-economic and politi-
cal domains (as in competition with Islamic culture, values, and governance 
frameworks) and its fallouts on the Muslim youth are many. 
Globalization understood as development that makes international operation 
possible is in simple terms mostly projected as a pathway to universality and 
global integration. A deeper analysis introduces one to socio-cultural, econom-
ic and political costs that globalization entails. The global trade policies contin-
ue to affect subsistence farmers negatively. Free trade allows unwanted and 
substandard goods from the developed countries an easy entry into the markets 
of the developing world (for further information read Cancun talks, Doha round 
of talks etc.). A practice integral to globalization is the privatization of national 
assets that makes the cost of living unaffordable for the ordinary people. Eco-
nomic geniuses Mahbub-ul Haq and Amartya Sen argued in favour of moral 
economy – but quite clearly, globalization patterns are still not pro poor. West-
                                                             
7  NDC S/194/17.  
8  NDC- S-221/21. 
9  NDC/S-162. 30-06-1914. Confidential letter No 497 of 1914 from W. H. Lucas Esquire, 
Commissioner in Sind, to Lord Willingdon of Ratton, Governor and President in Council 
Bombay; Judicial Department, Office of the Commissioner in Sind, Karachi. He informs 
about Sardar Muhammad Yakub, C. I. E, former District Magistrate, Thar and Parker reported 
to the Government on the working of the ‘Criminal Tribes Act’ dated July 1901. 
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ern liberal economic development frameworks are superimposed on local ways 
of living, working, household dynamics; they are overturning local gender 
norms and roles by hiring women as cheap labour in industry, and leaving men 
unemployed or promoting labour migration that ultimately only offers to them 
working long hours under highly exploitative working conditions.  
Globalization and the introduction of western socio-economic liberal 
frameworks in postcolonial Muslim societies have certainly played a role in 
introducing religion-based ultra-conservatism, fundamentalism and orthodoxy 
in these populations. Globalization patterns deny justice and autonomy to local 
populations who become increasingly alienated from the systems within which 
they operate. Societies become more fragmented, i.e. those moving within 
western ideological frameworks are considered as very productive and useful 
for society as opposed to those who resist Western influence are immediately 
labeled as threats to society. The larger segment of population becomes in-
creasingly isolated – labeled as marginalized in social sciences.  
In recent years people in Pakistan have started adopting Saudi Wahhabi ap-
pearance, with men growing beards and wearing traditional clothing with 
skullcaps and women putting on the abaya (a long cloak), and niqaab. Consid-
ering Pakistan’s socio-economic and political context, the research participants 
postulated a nexus between a crisis in social status and identity and the use of 
pronounced religious appearance and symbolism.  
A participant described:  
On becoming hopeless people try to find spiritual contentment through a 
source. Such a source is only the Divine. And then one notices sudden chang-
es in people [...] growing a beard and wearing a skullcap, and becoming more 
and more inclined to religion Basically, he is trying to assign some value to 
himself by becoming very religious [...] so that people respect them. 
The insanity of wealth-oriented global development gets a response in the form 
of counter narratives, standpoints and social movements. Populations start 
responding to global processes in historically and culturally distinct ways. 
Indigenous symbols are invoked during anti-globalization protests. In the case 
of Pakistan, these symbols are mostly religious, as the very creation of Pakistan 
is a result of rise of Muslim nationalism and the use of religious symbolism on 
the way. People question as to who are their legitimate leaders: those who serve 
western markets or those who would, for example, allow their own people 
more autonomy?  
Worldwide, Muslim governments adopted secular western liberal economic 
frameworks. Largely, poverty remained unsolved. This failure of national gov-
ernments to usher in an era of economic development through use of western 
liberal frameworks became the principle grounds on which demands for revert-
ing back to the original (i.e. Islamic frameworks of socio-economic, political 
and legal development) were based.  
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4.3  Local Maladies, Crisis in Masculinity and Logic of Militant 
Islamism 
Malik (1997) identifies three foundations of power in Pakistan: feudalism 
(landed and religious aristocracy), bureaucracy and military. One may add to 
this list gender as in Pakistani society a boy is born privileged and a girl under-
privileged. Accordingly, if one were to review Malik’s foundations of power in 
Pakistan, all three institutions immediately generate the contemporary male 
archetypes of a feudal lord, a warrior, and a bureaucrat who manages to oblige 
and draw favours in return. Governability crisis in Pakistan is mainly a result of 
power imbalances between these three foundations of power.  
The military is a pervasive force with expanding professional and corporate 
interests encompassing the government, the economy and the society. Within 
cantonments army-run schools, hospitals, departmental stores and transporta-
tion provide standard to high-standard facilities for army families as opposed to 
substandard services that the civilian government provides for ordinary citi-
zens. In response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979) the Pakistan 
military and the US became principle trainers and financiers of jihadism in the 
region. Militancy increased and militarization of civilian spaces developed as 
an urban norm. 
Pakistan’s governance history reveals not only corruption and incompe-
tence, but also flawed decision-making to the detriment of its own people. 
Many times the State of Pakistan has acted in hypermasculinized manner. Re-
cently, in 2009, the government promulgated Nizam-i Adl Ordinance in Swat, 
ironically abdicating in favor of the Taliban precisely known for their anti-state 
activities in the country. By doing so the government allowed a criminal group 
with demonically totalitarian masculinity to take the throne – literally leaving 
Swat’s civilians at the mercy of the Taliban. Unwittingly the government vio-
lated the social contract between itself and its law-abiding citizens and instead 
of immediately providing protection to the affected population the state further 
marginalized and alienated them. Finally the military was asked to step in and 
save Swat.  
Even today, the state of Pakistan has no vision to offer to its citizens and is 
incapable of handling a Wahhabi-affected population while nipping out mili-
tant and terrorist elements from the country. Owing to conflict, people have lost 
their net financial assets (NFAs), and sources of income. Unemployment af-
fects income – but conflict destroys savings and NFAs generating wide scale 
insecurities in the affected populations.  
The research sample of men belonging to Waziristan and Swat elaborated on 
the self-prestige issues war and displacement generate. They suffered from 
occupational and status inequalities and regularly tolerated discrimination, bias 
and prejudice in other parts of Pakistan as everyone perceived them as Taliban 
or Al-Qaeda accomplices and not as ordinary conflict-affected civilians. It 
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should not be surprising if this emerging underclass in Pakistan – alienated 
from the mainstream, develops its own subculture, and opts for violence. Pov-
erty affects women and men differently. In Pakistan, unlike women, men have 
an allocated/assigned gender role of being financial providers for their nucleus 
and extended families. Poverty puts masculinity in crisis. A few relevant quotes 
from the research sample are provided below: 
A man is upset about everything: employment, expenses, poverty and domes-
tic environment. He suffers in times of poverty, when life is unaffordable. 
Men have to put on a façade and keep that illusion of financial stability alive 
[...] even if they are not stable, particularly if they are displaced.  
Relatives target unemployed men. We know that the whole [governance] sys-
tem has failed in this country [...] but it is one individual man who is made an-
swerable and accountable for failing to earn. A man feels totally victimized 
under such circumstances, and he is helpless. 
They are offered huge sums of money and given access to a wide range of re-
sources […]. This is how they become terrorists. We can blame the outside el-
ements or forces for misguiding our youth into terrorism but the fact of the 
matter is that [pause] what environment has Pakistan provided them? Poverty, 
illiteracy, hunger, joblessness – what else? 
Poverty […] curtains people’s sense of judgment. Unemployment is a huge 
pressure and that makes individuals join so-called jihadi organizations. Most 
men accept offers of jihad as the organizations take responsibility for their 
families and welfare. They are given money. Men say [...] why not take this 
money for food? 
According to research participants, the affluent Muslim youth living in the 
West feel socio-political marginalization, even if they are financially stable. 
Therefore, they may opt for militant Islamism and/or terrorism. The sample 
opined that at times merely a need to gain fame may generate similar interests 
among the rich.  
Force can be used due to personal attitudinal problems, the disturbed inter-
nal logic of individuals and their view of society, and at times substantive so-
cio-economic factors existing in an individual’s overall context. Deeply frus-
trated individuals can inflict harm on both themselves and others, and the same 
holds true for Pakistani men who within a constraining and compulsive socio-
economic context try to salvage what is left of their masculinity.  
Opinions on the issue provided by the sample illustrate the point further: 
It is natural for any young man to go for something that provides a quick and 
easy fix. He will go for anything that serves his interest whether it is right or 
wrong. His interest is money, respect, honor and power. 
Pakistani men have an imprint in their psychology. ‘If I am a real man [...] I 
can make anything possible.’ […] The fact is that he cannot do anything be-
cause of the circumstances surrounding him. When he fails, he starts indulging 
in whatever else is possible for him [...] be it smoking, theft crime, murder etc. 
Once they start indulging in something, they go right to the end as then it be-
comes a test of their manhood. They never quit halfway as that makes them 
na-mard [eunuch]. 
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When unemployed men with multiple inadequacies get together, they get re-
organized as a gang and go around snatching mobiles and indulging in other 
street crimes. At times, they are picked up by other crime networks, even ter-
rorist networks, and are paid money to commit certain actions. The men start 
feeling as if they have found employment and success. Their actions serve 
their male ego. 
The research sample insisted that the current use of jihad is in contradiction to 
Islamic values where jihad is faith-based and in way of Allah. A participant 
noted:  
Suicide bombing or bombing – the type we are witnessing today is all terror-
ism [...] and not jihad. It is very simple to differentiate between the two. Jihad 
is not a job: you bomb that place and I give you this much money. But men 
are taking it like a job. They do this for money. A jihadi is supposed to be very 
humble. He does not boast that I am better than you. He fights against oppres-
sion and injustice. Our men are telling everyone that they are better than oth-
ers. This is pride and arrogance. This is not jihad. This is terrorism. 
5.  The Great Disconnect: Locating Islamic and Customary 
Gender Norms in the Real World 
Research participants emphasized that cultural preferences demand that men be 
financial providers and guarantors of individual/collective honor and that Is-
lamic texts and narratives cement this assigning of gender roles even further. 
The most prominent gender role assigned, and perhaps the most discussed by 
Western and Muslim feminists alike, is that of men made qawwam (custodian) 
over women. The Quran informs us: “al-rijal qawwamun ‘ala al-nisa […]” or 
“men are qawwamun (custodian) in relation to women […]” (4:34). Islamic 
scholars interviewed during research insisted that this Divine-assigned mascu-
line role of qawwam or qawwamun does not make men guards but guardians 
for women and responsible for their overall socio-economic and emotional 
welfare. A Muslim man is under religious obligation to take care of his 
wife/wives by virtue of being her/their qawwam. As a true follower of Islam, a 
man is expected to keep his family well fed and comfortable: a man who has the 
character and the strength to earn qasb halal (legitimate livelihood) for the sup-
port of his family. Divorce does not alter any arrangement and men must contin-
ue providing maintenance to former wife/wives according to court orders.  
Islamic sacred texts do not present the female body as weak and make refer-
ences to the trials of childbirth. A woman completes her cultural (not quite 
religious) obligation by giving birth. Islam does not make it her duty to feed the 
child. The Quran allows a wife to take money from her husband if she feeds the 
child. A research participant from among the professional men alerted: 
In other words, Islam clearly conveys to Muslim men that she has special 
rights and privileges over him – whether he likes it or not. In fact, this mother-
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child example is a very extreme example but this tells a man his right place. 
Basically he is told not to expect anything from anyone [...] not even from his 
wife feeding his children for free. 
Although women can procreate – reproduction does not appear as a Divine-
assigned feminine role for Muslim women. In fact, the Quran notes infertility 
as a trial from God. 
The research participants insisted that if Islam was in any way rigorous or 
gender-biased, it was so against men. Men struggled to convey their despera-
tion where a religion imposes on them economic and family duties that they 
cannot easily fulfill in contemporary Muslim societies. A quote in point:  
The issue is that he is made responsible for women. Both religion [Islam] and 
Pakistani culture have made him accountable. In the real world, he does not 
have the sources of production [...] of income, and he does not have that secu-
rity through which he can confidently act responsible for the welfare of his 
women. Then he gets frustrated and begins to act in manners that are totally 
unacceptable. 
Similarly, jihad in the battlefield, if required, is termed obligatory for men but 
not for women. The hardship of battle and jihad is made obligatory for men 
considering their physical attributes, and women are exempted from all con-
frontational forms. Martyrdom is what brave men are believed to aspire.  
We know that martyr is the highest rank in Islam. Any man would act in this 
way with the hope of achieving glory and pride. Our men are exploited in the 
name of jihad etc. Promises of heaven are made to them. We cannot see what 
happens to them in the hereafter, but one can assume that they probably never 
go to paradise. Who can [...] after killing innocent people? They go for the 
charm of martyrdom. 
Across stratified research samples that I investigated, respect and honor appear 
as central themes in the articulation of masculinity and manhood. Evidence 
shows that anything involving action, war, militancy and rebellion has a certain 
masculine charm for Pakistani men, as most perceive it as somewhat heroic, 
even if fallacious.  
6.  Discussion 
Political analysts, for example, Sageman (2009), and Shapiro and Fair (2009) 
have questioned the assumed link between poverty on one hand, and terrorism 
and/or militancy on the other. Although my research does not build a case for 
such a supposition as a discernible symbiotic relationship between poverty and 
terrorism – neither does it support an argument for delinking poverty from 
militancy and/or terrorism. 
My research findings lead me to figure that one of the most prominent 
themes of causes of militant Islamism and/or terrorism remains poverty. As 
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indicated throughout this paper, relative poverty is not restricted to money but 
is more complex and includes issues of marginalization, alienation, prejudice, 
bias, discrimination, stereotyping, profiling and so forth. For example, appar-
ently very rich individuals may feel terribly inferior and disadvantaged in a 
globalized world due to their identity. According to social theory, considering 
poverty as a money matter is incorrect and erroneous. Sociologists and devel-
opment theorists must prevent political sciences from attempting to delink 
poverty from violence (be it in any form).  
Having stated this, my comprehension of the issue is that coherence is need-
ed between religious and cultural masculinity imperatives and the socio-
economic context within which masculinities are produced. However, in the 
case of Pakistan, socio-economic expectations of men are high and the socio-
economic context of the country is deplorable. Issues of self-actualization and 
feelings of inadequacy often caused by unemployment affect masculine prac-
tices in a negative manner. Among Muslim communities, where men are sup-
posed to be qawwam of their household, poverty jeopardizes masculine honor 
at a subjective and somewhat communal level. The affected man makes at-
tempts to regain his position in the appropriate gender order through acts of 
violence that are culturally perceived as normative performances of the mascu-
line.  
7.  Conclusion 
For the Pakistani youth, living in contemporary Pakistan in a globalized world 
is not very different from living under the colonial masters. Issues remain the 
same: joblessness, religious profiling and associated disadvantages in a com-
petitive environment – ultimately generating identity anxiety, class-based soci-
ety and lack of autonomy. Interestingly, trends in religious revivalism in and 
around the subcontinent, particularly those in the Middle East have intensified 
and along with it sentiments of Pan-Islamism, also known as transnational 
Islamism. Religious ideological exchanges that were not convenient under the 
British raj – are now freely floating in a digital world. Militant or Jihadist Is-
lamism and other forms of proactive Islamism exist in the documented history 
of the region and help Muslim youth rationalize their actions today. One may 
step into the domain of militant jihadist Islamism or into the domain of terror-
ism – but gender issues crosscut both. In my analysis it is men’s articulation of 
their personhood, principally mediated by religious and cultural masculine 
imperatives that are animated through Islamism.  
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